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Introduction 
The Arab Spring was a regional social mobilization that unrevealed ruling-bargains in the 
Middle East, which have been resilient since the early 1950s. In Tunisia, Ben Ali was ousted in 
about three weeks and fled to Saudi Arabia. After two weeks of demonstrations in Egypt, 
Mubarak resign from the presidency because the police failed to quell the uprising and the 
military refused to come to his aid. Following his resignation, he was arrested by the military and 
is currently awaiting trial for killing demonstrators, embezzlement of state funds, etc. In Libya, 
Qaddafi was ousted in an eight month civil war with NATO intervention that resulted in his 
demise. Despite the successful revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, some ruling-bargains 
have survived, such as in Syria.  
In the beginning of the Syrian uprising, it appeared Assad’s ruling bargain was 
unraveling and it was only a matter of time before he met a similar fate like Ben Ali, Mubarak 
and Qaddafi. However, overtime the conflict morphed into a sectarian struggle that divided the 
country among sectarian and socioeconomic lines. The sectarian nature of the conflict has 
prevented the regime from falling. As a result, my research question is how does identity politics 
explain the resilience of Assad’s ruling bargain? This question is important because it will 
explain the survival of authoritarianism and how identity politics can hinder the perquisite for 
democratization, the need for national unity. It will also help U.S. policymakers by showing 
them the concerns of minorities if the regime falls. Minorities are convinced there is no future for 
them in a post-Assad Syria, so they support the regime largely out of fear of the alternative. 
Guaranteeing these communities they have a future will bring down Assad and may bring fourth 
democratization.  
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This paper will first explain what authoritarianism is and explore factors that contribute 
to the survival of authoritarianism, such as repression, legitimacy, external factors and 
cooptation. Finally, an analysis will be provided to explain how Assad has manipulated Syria’s 
heterogeneous nature to ensure his survival by demonstrating how Alawites, Christians, Druze, 
the Sunni bourgeoisie and the State bourgeoisie have benefited from the ruling bargain. Along 
with how they have helped propped up Assad, such as forming paramilitary groups and how the 
ruling elite have remain loyal in a time of crisis. Since the uprising began, defections have 
rampant the ruling bargain. However, defections primarily occur in the lower positions of power, 
which are predominantly Sunni while Alawites control the upper echelons of power. These 
defections have gradually created a storage of man power to confront the opposition and defend 
strategic positons.  
However, the formation of paramilitaries under the National Defense Forces (NDF) have 
solved this problem. Also, the growing sectarian nature of the civil war has made minorities 
more dependent on the regime for protection because of the fear of being targeted by 
fundamentalist elements of the opposition like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 
Jabhat Al-Nusra. Finally, Assad has retain support from critical institutions in society like the 
military. This due to the fact that critical positions are filled with close relatives to Assad. From 
the role of minorities in the conflict and having a family based regime, my thesis is the 
cooptation of minorities and relatives into the ruling bargain has enabled Assad’s regime to 
survive.    
Explaining the Survival of Authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism is a system to govern society where order and control is favored over 
liberty. In authoritarianism, society is either ruled by a single individual with absolute power, or 
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a ruling coalition where power is distributed within the coalition.  In most cases the ruling 
coalition usually makes up about one percent of society. The coalition consists of different 
aspects of society, such as institutions that support the regime for privileges like power, wealth 
and security in exchange for support. An example is when Gretchen Casper states in Fragile 
Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, “Under authoritarianism, the church or 
military are pulled into an active political stance in support of the regime (in the case of the 
military), or opposition to it (as with the church).”1  The church and military are examples of 
institutions that can be part of the coalition.  
Under authoritarian rule, the one percent monopolizes power and the majority is largely 
excluded from different aspects of society like the political and economic realms. An example of 
an authoritarian regime is in Syria where the Assad family has ruled the country for the past 
forty-five years. Assad has monopolized power by putting loyal family members and friends in 
the upper echelons of society regardless of their qualifications. As a result, this has excluded the 
majority of Syrians from having a role in governing the country. The purpose of this is to ensure 
the survival of the regime and maintain the status quo. 
However, one of the main drawbacks of authoritarianism is that it’s an unstable form of 
government in the long-run. According to Gretchen Casper, “instability could generate from the 
erosion of the regime’s legitimacy, defections of key members of the regime’s support coalition, 
conflict within the ruling block itself, or the emergence of a credible alternative leader.”2      
Within the forty-five years that the Assad family has ruled Syria, the regime experienced three 
events that have shaken the regime to its core. From 1979 to 1982, there was an Islamist 
                                                          
1Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule  (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg 
Press, 1995), 4 
2Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule  (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg 
Press, 1995),6 
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insurgency that almost pushed the country to the brink of civil war. In 1983, there was an 
attempted coup by Hafiz Al-Assad’s brother Rif’at when Assad was incapacitated due to an 
illness. Finally, there is the current civil war that has tested the regime to its limits. Despite the 
challenges autocrats encounter, many of them have been able to survive for long periods of time 
like Assad. As a result, scholars have develop four theories to explain the resilience of 
authoritarianism. These theories consist of repression, legitimacy, external factors and 
cooptation.  
Repression 
The first school of thought consists of repression. Repression is the state’s use of 
coercion to restrict the ability of the majority from participating in the political realm of society. 
In Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy, Abel Escriba-Folch 
acknowledges Davenport’s claim that, “state coercion has two basic components: violent 
repression that violates personal integrity and less violent (or nonviolent) activities that restrict 
civil liberties.”3 Both violent and nonviolent methods of coercion are utilize by autocrats to 
maintain order.  
Scholars like Abel Escriba-Folch, Sergei Guriev, Daniel Treisman, and Ronald A. 
Francisco analyze whether repression is an effective strategy to increase the chances of survival 
for an authoritarian system. Abel Escriba-Folch proclaims, “The results reveal that repression 
certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival.”4 His analysis of the relationship 
between survival and repression demonstrates that repression is effective in increasing the 
chances of survival. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman in How Modern Dictators Survive: 
                                                          
3 Abel Escriba-Folch, “Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy,” International Political Science 
Review 34 5 (2013): 546 
4 Abel Escriba-Folch, “Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy,” International Political Science 
Review 34 5 (2013): 543 
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Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression also assert that repression is an effective 
strategy. However, they declare “repression is used against citizens only as a last resort when the 
opportunities to survive through co-optation, censorship, and propaganda are exhausted.5 From 
their research repression acts as a useful means when all other methods have been exhausted to 
quell unrest.  
 The main dilemma with the use of repression is it can generate resentment towards the 
state and backfire. For example, Ronald A. Francisco proclaims in Repression and Mobilization, 
“Lichbach’s theorems demonstrate that consistent repression necessarily increases the amount of 
revolutionary zeal in a country.”6 In the case of Syria, repression did work when Hafiz Al-Assad 
crushed the Islamist insurgency in Hama of 1982. Yet, when Bashar followed his father’s 
strategy, repression backfired by increasing the revolutionary of zeal among Syrians, sparked 
international outrage and ignited an armed insurgency.    
Legitimacy 
 The second school of thought is legitimacy. Legitimacy involves the notion whether the 
public accepts the ruling regime. Paul Brooker proclaims in Non-Democratic Regimes, “One 
critical aspect for the consolidation of authoritarian rule involves seeking legitimacy.”7 In 
democratic societies, the majority of the public does not question the legitimacy of their leaders 
because they gain their right to lead through fair elections, where the public votes for their rulers. 
In the case of autocrats, they have to prove why the public should accept them. They often rely 
                                                          
5 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and 
Repression (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2015), 1.  
6Francisco, Ronald A. “The Dictator’s Dilemma.” in Repression and Mobilization, edited by Christian Davenport, 
Hank Johnson, and Carol Mueller, 65 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.     
7 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 106 
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on nationalist sentiment to where Paul Brooker proclaims, “The majority of authoritarian rulers 
justify their rule by playing on national interests or patriotic claims.”8  
However, some autocrats have survived with little legitimacy. Instead they generate fear 
in society by brutally crushing dissent and rely on their foreign alliances for support. Prior to the 
Syrian uprising, Assad justified his rule by claiming he is the only Arab leader willing to 
confront Israel. Despite his stance towards Israel, this did not prevent the majority of Syrians 
from rebelling against him. Assad lost legitimacy domestically, regionally and international due 
to his use of force to quell the demonstrations. The loss of legitimacy has weaken the regime but, 
it has been able to survive by crushing dissent, exploiting sectarianism and relying on Russia, 
China, Iran and Hezbollah for support.  
External Factors 
External factors is the third school of thought. External factors includes the role of 
outsiders in a state’s affairs. Scholars like Nicole J. Jackson, Peter Burnell and Oliver 
Schlumberger argue the role of external factors is essential to the survival of authoritarianism. 
According to Nicole J. Jackson in International Politics and National Political Regimes: 
Promoting Democracy-Promoting Autocracy, “external factors influence authoritarian states to 
maintain the status quo and further entrench authoritarian rule.” 9 Today, two states play a 
pivotal role in supporting authoritarian leaders, and they are Russia and China. Peter Burnell and 
Oliver Schlumberger states in Promoting- Democracy -Promoting Autocracy? International 
Politics and the National Political Regimes, “the largest players are Russian and China both at 
the forefront of today’s intense intellectual interest in authoritarian renewal and what it means for 
                                                          
8 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 109 
9 Nicole J. Jackson, “The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-Liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A 
Case Study of Russia’s Influence on Central Asian Regimes,” Contemporary Politics 16 1 (2010): 102. 
8 
 
international politics.”10 Foreign powers bolster authoritarian leaders by providing political, 
economic and military assistance.  
An example is the Russian and Syrian relationship where Roy Allison states in Russia 
and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis, “Russia has provided a diplomatic 
shield for Syrian state and bolstered it with arms supplies.”11  Assad also receives support from 
Iran and Hezbollah in terms of economic and military. An example is when Milani Mohsen 
states in Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism), “In July 2013, the two nations signed an 
agreement in which the Iranian Central Bank pledged to provide its Syrian counterpart with a 
$3.6 billion line of credit to purchase Iranian oil in exchange for allowing Iran to invest the 
equivalent amount in Syria.”12 This credit has enabled Assad to maintain the war effort by 
purchasing more arms.  
Despite Assad’s foreign support, some regimes have survived with limited outside 
support. An example is North Korea where the Kim Jong Dynasty has ruled for the past seventy 
years. The regime follows a strict isolation policy where it has minimum contact with the 
outside. The country does have relations with other states like China, but overall North Korea 
has few close allies. The regime relies on repression, propaganda and cooptation to survive. The 
dependency on these methods have gradually turn North Korea into a totalitarian state over time, 
which is an extreme form of authoritarianism.   
 
 
                                                          
10 Peter Burnell and Oliver Schlumberger, “Promoting- Democracy -Promoting Autocracy? International Politics 
and the National Political Regimes,” Contemporary Politics 16 1 (2010): 12. 
11 Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International Affairs 89 4 
(2013): 795 
12 Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism),” Washington Quarterly 36 4 (2013): 87. 
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Cooptation 
The final school of thought consists of cooptation. Cooptation is a tactic deployed by 
autocrats to incorporate components of society into the ruling bargain by providing privileges in 
exchange for support. Scholars like Beatriz Magaloni, Milan W. Svolik, Jennifer Gandhi and 
Adam Przeworski, assert cooptation is critical for survival. According to Jennifer Gandhi and 
Adam Przeworski in Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats, “autocrats face two 
types of threats to their rule: those that emerge from within the ruling elite and those that come 
from outsiders within society.”13 The most common threat usually emerges within the regime 
itself.  
To eliminate threats the regime co-opts forces in society that pose a threat, such as state 
institutions, members of civil society, etc. Beatriz Magaloni demonstrates in Credible Power-
Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule Power how dictators eliminate threats when he 
states, “dictators can minimize the risks of being overthrown when they are able to co-opt 
potential rivals by offering credible power-sharing deals that guarantee a share of power over the 
long run.”14 Power is shared among different aspects of society to where a ruling coalition is 
formed that entrenches the authoritarian structure. 
 However, a persistent threat to the ruling coalition is factionalism. Members of the ruling 
elite may try to increase their power at the expense of others. An illustration is when Milan W. 
Svolik states in Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes, “When the 
members of the ruling coalition suspect that the dictator is making steps towards strengthening 
                                                          
13 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative 
Politics Studies 40 11 (2007): 1280.  
14 Beatriz Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule Power, “Comparative 
Politics Studies 41 4/5 (2008): 738. 
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his position at their expense, they may stage a coup in order to stop him.”15 An example is the 
Hafiz Al-Assad and Salah Jadid rivalry before Assad’s Corrective Movement of 1970. Both 
Assad and Jadid were from the Alawite community and were powerful figures in the Syrian 
Ba’thist ruling coalition. Gradually, tension brew between them, especially after the Arab’s 
defeat in the Six-Day War. According to Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: 
Politics and Society under Assad and the Ba’th Party, “The conflict took a more serious 
proportions after the Arab military defeat in June 1967, partly due to differences of opinion over 
military, foreign and socioeconomic policies which were then to be pursued.”16  
The rivalry split the ruling coalition between an Assad faction and Jadid faction. In the 
end, Assad out maneuvered Jadid and ousted him in a coup called the Corrective Movement. 
After Assad came to power, he brought an end to Syria’s instability by purging Jadid supporters, 
interweaving minorities, family, and friends into the ruling bargain. Loyalists of Assad received 
security, power, and wealth in exchange for support. The cooptation of these groups has enabled 
the regime to survive because their interests are interwoven within the regime. If Assad falls, 
they risk losing everything they gained and becoming marginalized.   
The Probable Explanation  
Repression, Legitimacy, External Factors and Cooptation are strategies utilize by 
authoritarian regimes to ensure their survival.  From these four strategies cooptation presents the 
most compelling to explain the survival of autocrats. Repression is useful to eliminate threats to 
the status quo, but it can backfire by increasing the revolutionary zeal of the opposition. Assad’s 
use of repression to crush the peaceful demonstrations increased the revolutionary zeal of the 
                                                          
15 Milan W. Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of 
Political Science 53 2 (2009): 481. 
16Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the Ba’th Party (New 
York: I.B. Tarius & Co Ltd, 2011), 62. 
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opposition, drew international criticism and ignited an armed insurgency. Legitimacy is 
improbable because some regimes have survived with little legitimacy. Instead they rely on 
repression, manipulation and foreign support for survival, such as in Syria today. Assad has 
survived by eliminating dissent, exploiting sectarianism and relying on his foreign allies.  
External factors is impractical because regimes have survived with little foreign support 
like North Korea. In Syria, support from Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah have helped Assad 
by providing political, military and economic support. However, a critical component to Assad’s 
survival is his strategy to demonize the opposition as terrorists and release fundamentalists with 
links to Al-Qaeda from prison. This strategy has rallied minorities around the regime and prevent 
humanitarian intervention because minorities and the international community fear the 
alternative if Assad falls. Cooptation presents the best explanation because when elements of 
society are integrated into the system, they benefit from the privileges granted to them in 
exchange for support.  
Factionalism is a persistent threat to the ruling coalition. However, everyone must think 
twice before turning against the status quo because they could lose what they gain and plunge 
society into anarchy. Assad has survived by integrating Alawites, Christians, the Sunni 
Bourgeoisie and State Bourgeoisie into the ruling bargain. These groups have benefited from the 
regime in terms of security, power and wealth. They are reluctant to abandon Assad because they 
fear losing what they gained and becoming marginalized in a post-Assad Syria.        
Alawites 
Syria is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the Middle East. According to 
Raymond Hinnebusch and David W. Lesch in The Government and Politics of the Middle East 
and North Africa, “Sunnis constitute 74 percent of the population, with Alawites at 12 percent, 
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Christians at 10 percent,Druzes at 3 percent and Jews other Muslim sects like Ismailis at 1 
percent.”17 For the past forty-five years, Syria has been ruled by an offshoot of Shia Islam 
minority called the Alawites. Prior to the Ba’thist coup of 1963 and Hafiz Al-Assad’s Corrective 
Movement in 1970, the Alawites were marginalized in society. They were discriminated and 
subordinate to Sunni domination. This treatment is demonstrated when Jomana Qaddour states in 
Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria, “Before Assad came into power, the portion of the 
Alawites society not enlisted in the military were often hired as servants to Sunnis.”18  
However, when the Ba’thists took over in 1963, life changed for the community. 
According to Nikolaos Van Dam, “Alawites were awarded scholarships and traveled abroad for 
higher degrees, becoming doctors, engineers, lawyers and university professors so that in the 
1990s they were strongly represented in the professions and senior cadres of the state, rivalling 
and sometimes displacing the Sunni and Christian intelligentsia.”19  When Hafiz Al-Assad came 
to power, the community continued to prosper. Hafiz created a power base among his fellow 
Alawites and relatives by putting them in high government positions like the bureaucracy. 
Assad’s favoritism towards Alawites is demonstrated when Joshua Landis proclaims in The 
Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad Regime is likely to Survive to 2013, “a Syrian 
ambassador who fled to Turkey told Hurriyet, “There are 360 diplomats within the Syrian 
Foreign Ministry with 60 percent Alawites and less than 10 percent Sunni.”20 The percentage 
difference between Alawites and Sunnis demonstrates that the ruling bargain is sectarian.  
                                                          
17Raymond Hinnebusch and David W. Lesch. “Syrian Arab Republic.” In The Government and Politics of the 
Middle East and North Africa, edited by Mark Gasiorowski, 262. Boulder: Westview Press, 2014. 
18 Jomana Qaddour, “Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria”, Washington Quarterly 36 4 (2013): 72. 
19 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the Ba’th Party (New 
York: I.B. Tarius & Co Ltd, 2011), 9. 
20 Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013”, Middle East 
Policy 19 1 (2012): 73. 
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When the 2011 Syrian uprising began, it appeared the fall of Assad’s ruling bargain was 
imminent. Bashar used repression like his father in Hama in 1982 to crush the uprising, but this 
time repression failed. Instead it backfired against the regime by exacerbating the situation. It 
increased the revolutionary zeal of the opposition, and severely undermine Assad’s legitimacy to 
where he lost significant amounts of support from the Sunni periphery. The use of force also 
sparked international outrage. The Arab League suspended Syria’s membership, the country was 
hit with sanctions, world leaders called for Assad to step down and the regime was plagued with 
defections.  
Despite these setbacks, Assad has been able to survive by exploiting sectarianism. The 
regime demonizes the opposition as fundamentalists which makes minorities reluctant from 
defecting out of fear of an uncertain future. This strategy also makes the international community 
reluctant to overthrow Assad because fundamentalist groups like Al-Nusra and the ISIS have 
become the strongest elements of the opposition. The fear of Syria falling into the hands of 
fundamentalists has made the international community wary of intervening despite their 
disproval of Assad. This strategy has also indoctrinated Alawites in believing they are nothing 
without the regime. Assad’s indoctrination has generated concerns within the community. They 
fear retribution because some elements of the opposition perceive them as apostates, they 
consider the community guilty base on association, and messages have emerge within the 
opposition threating Alawites. Jomana Qaddour captures the growing hostility towards Alawites 
when she states, “Images and videos emerging out of Syria since 2012, becoming increasingly 
violent and sectarian along the way, showcased extremist groups and even children chanting 
things like, “Assad we will bring you down, and then we will come next for the [Alawites]!”21 
                                                          
21 Jomana Qaddour, “Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria”, Washington Quarterly 36 4 (2013): 69. 
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The community also worries of becoming marginalize and subordinate to Sunni 
domination again. The fears of retribution and marginalization stems from observing the 
sectarianism that has unfolded in Iraq after the fall of Saddam in 2003. Sunnis are targeted and 
have become marginalized by the Shia government because they have been deemed guilty base 
on association. The indoctrination of the Alawite community enables the regime to prevent 
defections and sympathizing with the opposition by spreading fear within the community. This 
has caused the community to remain loyal to the regime and report those who try to flee or 
sympathize with the opposition. In one incident Jomana Qaddour proclaims, “A deserter who 
called his cousin, seeking help to escape Syria, was found dead the next morning, presumably 
because his own cousin had reported him.”22 Assad’s exploitation of sectarianism has not only 
pin communities against each other, but have turn family members against each other within 
communities. 
Christians 
 Similar to Alawites, Christians have prospered under Assad. Christians have rose to 
prominent positions within the system and according to Reese Erlich in Inside Syria: The 
Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect, “many Syrian Christians achieved 
higher incomes and educational levels than their Muslim counterparts, differences that persist 
today.”23  Also, the ruling bargain drawn in Christian’s base on portraying the regime as secular. 
When Hafiz-Al Assad was in power, he emphasized the need to do away with sectarianism and 
embrace Syrian Ba’thist identity. Nikolaos Van Dam states, Assad urged the public to abandon 
sectarianism:   
                                                          
22 Jomana Qaddour, “Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria”, Washington Quarterly 36 4 (2013): 71. 
23 Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2014), 133.  
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Islam is one thing and this gang is something else again. The Arab Ba’th Socialist 
Party is a nationalist party that does not differentiate between religions. As a 
faithful Muslim, I encourage everyone to have faith and fight rigidity and 
fanaticism, because they contradict Islam. I believe that a true Muslim is the 
brother of his Muslim and Christian brothers, and that a true Christian is the 
brother of the Christian and Muslim. If Syria had not always been above 
sectarianism, it would not now exist.”24 
 
The regime’s secularism provided a blanket of security for Christians. However, when the 
uprising broke out the blanket of security corroded. In the beginning, hostilities were directed 
towards the regime and the Alawite community. As the conflict progress, extremists groups took 
root in the country and hostilities towards Christians started to emerge. According Mary Mikhael 
in The Syrian War and the Christians of the Middle East, “slogans such as "Syria is the land of 
the Prophet!" or "Syria is the land of jihad" filled the air and these were directed towards 
Christians and other minorities.”25 These slogans have generated concerns within the 
community.    
 Now Christians no longer feel safe in their homeland. Violence has been inflicted upon 
them. An example when Reese Enrlich tells the story of Maryam in the city Qusayr, “where 
masked man entered their apartment one night with the intent to kidnap all the Christian men in 
Qusayr.”26 Moreover, Christian areas controlled by salafi fundamentalist groups like ISIS have 
been told to either convert or die. Due to the collapse of security within the country, many 
Christians have fled the country or moved to areas where the government still has firm control. 
The fear of Salafi fundamentalism has propelled Christians to rally around Assad, such as in 
Saidnaya. Frederik Pleitgen reports in Pro-Government Forces Find a Haven at Syria Town’s 
                                                          
24 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the Ba’th Party (New 
York: I.B. Tarius & Co Ltd, 2011), 95. 
25 Mary Mikhael, “The Syrian War and the Christians of the Middle East”, International Bulletin of Missionary 
Research 39 2 (2015): 70. 
26 Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2014), 133. 
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Christian Monastery, “Syrian Christian fighters have aided the Syrian Army in propelling the 
Jabhat el-Nusra’s advance towards Saidnaya.”27 
Druzes 
Compared to Alawites and Christians where the majority support Assad, it is difficult to 
pinpoint the Druze’s political affiliation because Firas Maksad states in The Druze Dilemma for 
Foreign Affairs, “determining the loyalties of Syria’s Druze has been difficult, as its members 
hide their political persuasions -- a preference for privacy with roots in their theological concept 
of taqiyya, the concealing of one’s religious beliefs to avoid accusations of heresy.”28 In the 
beginning of the conflict, the Druzes tried to maintained a neutral stance, but as Sarita Saad 
states in Lebanon Druze wary of being dragged into Syria conflict, “the killing of some of the 
sect’s religious leaders have dragged the community into the conflict.”29  
Since becoming involved in the conflict, the community has been divided between 
supporting Assad or not. Similar to Christians, some Druzes support the regime because of its 
secularist nature. An example is when a Druze name Akba Abu Shaheen tells Reese Erlich, “It’s 
important for me not to live in a religious country, but in a secular country.”30 Like other 
minorities the Druzes are fearful of being targeted by fundamentalists because they are perceived 
as heretics. As a result, some Druze have taken arms to defend their territory and form militias 
like the Jaysh Al-Muwahhideen, which mainly operates out of the Suwayda Province because it 
has the highest Druze population in the country.  
                                                          
27 Frederik Pleitgen, “Pro-Government Forces Find A Haven At Syria Town’s Christian Monastery”, CNN, January 
24, 2014, accessed May 1, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/24/world/meast/syria-christian-monastery/  
28 Firas Mksad, “The Druze Dilemma,” Foreign Affairs, October 14, 2014, accessed May 31, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2014-10-08/druze-dilemma 
29Sarita Saad, “Lebanon Druze Wary of Being Dragged into Syria Conflict,” Al Monitor, August 21, 2014, accessed 
May 31, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/08/syria-druze-under-attack-lebanon-potential-
support.html 
30 Reese Erlich, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2014), 194. 
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However, some Druzes have developed grievances towards Assad. According to Firas 
Maksad, “Their biggest grievance is that Assad has not provided them with enough weapons to 
defend against attacks by ISIS and al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Al-Nusra.”31 The 
community has threaten to turn its back against the regime, acquire arms from other sources, and 
act independently if Assad is not willing to help. The loss of the Druzes could be critical blow to 
the regime because Firas Maksad proclaims, “For Assad, the Druze are a strategic buffer, 
defending the southern flank of Damascus from rebel-controlled territory farther south.”32 The 
loss of the Druzes could open a path to allow the opposition to march into Damascus.   
Paramilitaries  
The concerns express by religious minorities provides Assad a support base and help 
bolster the regime’s military capabilities by forming paramilitary groups. These groups have 
been essential because the continuation of the war has taken its toll on the Syrian Army. 
According to the Carter Center in Syria: Pro-Government Paramilitary Forces, “Defections, 
desertions, battle losses, the challenges of urban warfare, and the war of attrition waged by the 
opposition significantly depleted the number of men available to fight.”33 The formation of 
paramilitary groups have help the regime to solve problems involving the Syrian Army, such as 
defections and the military’s inexperience to fight an asymmetric war. The Carter Center 
proclaims:  
 
This new formation meets a number of the government’s needs. First, men who 
joined the NDF did so voluntarily and, as such, the risk of defection is low. 
Second, the NDF gives a much needed numerical boost to government forces 
throughout the country. Third, NDF fighters, as irregular or paramilitary elements, 
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are receiving training in asymmetrical, urban, and guerrilla warfare - a style of 
war that the Syrian army was not prepared for, and which happens to be the 
dominant fighting mode of the opposition. Not all NDF members have completed 
their mandatory military service (conscription), so the government is allowing 
members to meet their conscription term in the NDF. Military officers attached to 
NDF units are in charge of coordinating with the regular army, planning 
operations, and calling in artillery and air support.34 
 
 
These paramilitary groups have been used to defend territories under government control while 
the Syrian Army goes on the offensive. They have also aided government forces in offensive 
operations, such as in Aleppo because according to the Carter Center, “These militias, unlike 
regular troops that come from different parts of the country, enjoy extensive knowledge of the 
local neighborhoods-turned-battlefields.35 As a result, paramilitaries have been vital to help 
maintain the war effort. 
Sunni Bourgeoisie  
 Despite losing the majority of Sunni periphery, Assad still retains support from the Sunni 
bourgeoisie or urban Sunnis. They have been reluctant to join the opposition because they have 
benefited from Assad’s economic liberalization policies during the early 2000s. When Bashar 
Al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000, he inherited a failing economy. Reese Erlich proclaims, 
“Syria was the second poorest country in the Middle East following Yemen before Assad’s 
economic reforms.”36 The poor performance of the economy could have ignited social unrest that 
could have threaten the ruling bargain. However, Assad launched economic reforms, which 
according to Reese Erlich included, “the privatization of some state-run industries and lowered 
tariffs on imported goods, following an economic model promoted by the International Monetary 
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Fund and the World Bank.”37 The Sunni bourgeoisie were able to purchase state own businesses 
or create their own business like insurance or telecommunication companies. Assad’s economic 
liberalization bought loyalty from them.  
 The civil war has brought further strains on an already fragile economy. Reese Erlich 
addresses: 
 
International sanctions against Syria, the loss of most exports, and the destruction 
of war sent the economy into a tailspin. Syria produced 425,000 barrels per day of 
crude oil in 2011, but that dropped to zero by the end of 2013 as rebels seized 
control of the oil fields. The Syrian gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 3.2 
percent in 2010 but dropped to -21.8 percent in 2012 and -22.5 percent in 2013.”38   
 
Despite the growing economic crisis many urban Sunnis still support the regime because they 
fear losing everything they gained during Assad’s economic reforms. They also fear the country 
side because some affiliate themselves with more extremist factions of the opposition. Some 
support from the Sunni periphery has prevented the opposition from achieving victory because 
Sunnis in urban areas like Aleppo have formed pro-regime militias as well like the Al-Quds 
Brigades and the Ba’th Brigades, which Edward Dark states in Pro-regime Sunni Fighters in 
Aleppo Defy Sectarian Narrative, “are almost entirely Sunni”39 These militias have lifted some 
burden from the Syrian Army by guarding checkpoints in Damascus or fighting on the front lines 
in critical cities like Aleppo.   
State Bourgeoisie 
 The sectarian nature of the ruling bargain has prevented defections in what Bassam 
Haddad calls the “State bourgeoisie” in Syria’s State Bourgeoisie: An Organic Backbone for the 
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Regime.40 This group is Assad’s inner circle who control institutions like the Military, 
Mukhabarat (secret police), Ba’th Party, Businesses, etc. The regime has suffered from 
defections, but Haddad states, “The main, and perhaps only, defections witnessed occurred at the 
lower and lower-middle levels within the army, with very few significant exceptions.”41 What 
makes Assad’s inner circle and state institutions remain loyal is the fact the majority of the 
critical positions are filled by Assad’s relatives. Joshua Landis, states in “The Regime” for 
Frontlines, “The brother in charge of security, cousins of the banking system, in laws of the 
military so in reality this is a family business”42 Some examples to demonstrate members of the 
Assad family are in the upper echelons of power are Bashar’s Assad’s brother Maher (Alawite) 
who commands the Republican Guard and the Fourth Armor Division. Asama-Al Assad who is 
Syria’s First Lady and a Sunni. Finally, Assad’s cousin Rami Maklouf (Alawite) who according 
to Resse Elrich, “owns the country’s largest cell phone company and made tens of millions of 
dollars base on family connections.”43 
 Hafiz and Bashar put close relatives in the upper echelons of society to ensure their 
survival and to consolidate their power. This brought an end to the country’s turbulent past prior 
to Assad’s rise to power. Coups were a persistent occurrence to the extent that some 
governments collapsed within less than a year. For the past forty-five years that the Assad family 
has been in power, there was only one attempted coup in late 1983. According Nikolaos Van 
Dam, “The only time since the early 1970s when the regime has been really shaken from within 
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its own organization was in November 1983, when Hafiz fell seriously ill and the question of his 
succession appeared to become acute.”44 His brother Rif’at tried to assume control when Assad 
was temporary incapacitated. However, Assad made a full recovery, assumed control, quickly 
brought an end to the coup and exiled his brother for an indefinite amount of time.  
Putting relatives in critical positions have also limit defections at the top when the regime 
encounters a crisis, such as the civil war today. Sargon Hadaya notes in A Proxy War in Syria, 
“only 47 people (27 high-ranking military and law enforcers, three Cabinet members, four 
members of the parliament, and 12 diplomats)* defected between June 2011 and August 2012 
and none of them belonged to the president's closest circle of decision makers.”45 One of the 
critical proponents that led to Ben Ali’s and Mubarak’s downfall was the independent nature of 
the military from the regime. Mehran Kamrava states in Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving 
Ruling Bargain in the Middle East, “when the military realized that the unfolding crisis could not 
be stopped and that the continued alliance with the civilian leadership could harm its professional 
and corporate interests, it deliberately distanced itself from  civilian dictators making their 
demise inevitable”46 In Syria, the military is integrated within the regime because Assad has 
appointed relatives within critical positions of  the military like Maher. States institutions are 
deeply embedded in the regime to where Mehran Kamrava proclaims, “The ruling elite, and the 
secret police are so intertwined that it is now impossible to separate the Assad regime from the 
security establishment.”47   
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In order to become part of the ruling coalition or move up the ladder loyalty became a 
perquisite to where to Joshua Landis notes in The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad 
Regime is likely to Survive to 2013, “Under the Assads, loyalty quickly became the ultimate 
qualification for advancement into the upper ranks of the security forces.”48 Those loyal to Assad 
benefited from the ruling bargain in terms of power, wealth and security in return for support. 
Assad integrated every institution into the ruling bargain to consolidate his control and make it 
where if any force threatens to bring down the regime, they will have to destroy the whole 
structure, construct a new ruling bargain from scratch and run the risk of turning Syria into the 
next Iraq or Libya.   
The Absence of National Unity 
 Assad’s exploitation of sectarianism has prevented minorities from defecting and 
sympathizing with the opposition out of fear. As a result, this has severely undermine the 
prospects of democracy in Syria because the country lacks the most fundamental perquisite for a 
transition towards democracy, which is national unity. Georg Sorsensen states in Democracy and 
Democratization: Process and Prospects in a Changing World, “according to Rustow, national 
unity simply indicates that “the vast majority of citizens in democracy-to-be…have no doubt or 
mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”49 Assad has undermine 
national unity by including some groups in the ruling bargain and excluding others.  
Prior to the revolution, society trusted each other regardless of one’s religious affiliation. 
This is demonstrated when Reese Erlich describes a small town where a Christian university 
professor name Hagop lives, “the town is twelve miles from central Damascus, the town is 
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mixed between Sunni, Christian and Druze and before the crisis residents formed friendships and 
business relations that extended among all religious groups.”50   Today, trust among the various 
religious communities have eroded and a deep mistrust has developed in society, where everyone 
is suspicious of each other. An example is when an Alawite government employee name 
Ebrahim tells Reese Erlich, “If you’re invited to dinner by a Sunni, you would be afraid of an 
ambush, so you would refuse.”51 Assad has used sectarianism to his advantage by driving a 
wedge between the various groups. This strategy has fragmented society and disoriented the 
main purpose of the revolution, which is to overthrow Assad. Now it appears removing Assad 
has become a secondary objective and every group is fighting mainly to curve out a piece of 
territory for themselves.    
Conclusion 
 The Syrian civil war is now a war of attrition and recently Assad has suffered setbacks, 
such as the loss of the Idlib province to Islamist elements of the opposition. This is the second 
province that has fallen to the opposition following the Raqqa province in 2013. The 
prolongation of the conflict and if the regime continues to experience setbacks will take its toll 
on Assad’s forces by draining their moral and resources. Also, the war has drained the country’s 
economy where it struggles to provide goods and services. My findings demonstrate how the 
regime has relied on a coalition of support for survival and how the sectarian nature of the 
conflict does not only cross religious lines, but socioeconomic as well. Alawites, Christians and 
Druze support the regime because it provides them with privileges and security. These 
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communities fear retribution and marginalization if the regime falls. Their concerns have rallied 
the communities around the regime and help bolster its forces by forming paramilitary groups.  
 Despite the fact the majority of Sunnis have rebelled against Assad, he still retains 
significant amounts of support from the Sunni bourgeoisie, who have benefited from the 
economic reforms of the early 2000s. They too fear what will happen to them if the ruling 
bargain collapses. Having Sunni support has denied the opposition a quick and absolute victory. 
Some Sunnis have taken up arms to fight alongside the regime like the Ba’th Brigade. Unlike 
Ben Ali, Mubarak and Qaddafi, Assad still retains support from the state bourgeoisie because 
critical positions are controlled by relatives. Constructing a ruling bargain base on minorities and 
relatives has decrease the likelihood of defections and coups. Those who turn against the regime 
will not only lose their privileges, but their security as well. They will be targeted by Assad’s 
loyalists and the opposition. However, with the war of attrition, Assad’s recent setbacks, and a 
failing economy one could wonder how long will this coalition remain loyal?  
 My analysis will help U.S. policymakers become aware of why some groups are 
unwilling to abandon the regime. These communities are convince there is no future for them in 
a post-Assad Syria. Guaranteeing these groups they have a future, may bring the country together 
and bring forth the first phase of the democratic process, the breakdown of the authoritarian 
structure. However, Assad’s manipulation of the country’s heterogeneous nature has created 
multiple hurdles to overcome. How does a society restore faith in each other when everyone is 
fearful, suspicious and hold deep grievances towards each other? Unless faith is restored, the 
sectarian struggle will continue to escalate and groups like ISIS will continue to wreak havoc 
throughout the region. For Syria, the mostly likely scenario if the sectarian struggle continues is 
the partitioning of the country among the different factions like Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. 
25 
 
So far Assad has been resilient to where political scientist Elie El-Hindy tells Erlich Reese, 
“Assad was clever to play on the divergence in society and make people scared of each other.”52 
Assad’s ability to exploit the various identities and pinning them against each other has 
prevented him from meeting similar fates like Ben Ali, Mubarak and Qaddafi. Instead the regime 
has been able to survive and fight another day. 
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